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We develop and empirically test a model of foreign R&D investments that takes into account strategic 
interaction in R&D location decisions by multinational firms in the context of R&D spillovers and foreign 
technology sourcing strategies. In a two-country, two-firm model with cross investments, the optimal share of 
R&D performed abroad depends on the efficiency of intra-firm international technology transfer, the degree of 
inter-firm R&D spillovers, the intensity of product market competition, and the importance of the general 
knowledge pool. The impact of these factors differs markedly between technology leading firms and technology 
laggards. We find support for most of the predictions of the model in an empirical analysis of patents based on 
innovations in foreign countries by 131 leading European manufacturing firms in 22 ISIC industries in 1996-
1997. For technology leaders, the share of patents originating in other EU countries responds positively to host 
country product market competition and is strongly increasing in the level of intellectual property rights 
protection. Foreign R&D by technology laggards is discouraged by host country competition but increases with 
the efficiency of (reverse) technology transfer. Foreign R&D of both leaders and laggards increases with the size 
of the local knowledge pool and the size of production operations in the host country. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The internationalization of R&D by multinational firms is a phenomenon that has 
attracted growing interest among economists, management scholars, practitioners and policy 
makers (OECD 2005). An expanding literature has developed focusing on the determinants 
and role of R&D conducted in foreign affiliates (e.g. Kuemmerle 1997, Frost 2001, Florida 
1997, Belderbos, 2001; 2003; Kuemmerle, 1999; von Zedtwitz and Gassman, 2002; Odagiri 
and Yasuda, 1999; Zejan, 1990; Kumar 1996; Chung and Alcacer, 2002; Reger 2001, Le Bas 
and Sierra 2002) and the possible impact of such R&D and overseas knowledge sourcing on 
productivity of parent operations (Iwasa and Odagiri, 2003; Griffith, Harrison, and van 
Reenen, 2003, Fors, 1996). This literature suggests that whereas traditionally overseas R&D 
was conducted to adapt home-developed technologies to foreign markets (‘home base 
exploiting’ R&D), foreign R&D activities are now becoming more important vehicles to 
access local technological expertise abroad and to create new technologies (‘home base 
augmenting’ R&D).  
One issue that has been broadly neglected in the literature on determinants and effects of 
foreign R&D is the role of strategic considerations in R&D decisions by firms operating in 
oligopolistic industries. Such considerations can be expected to be important, as overseas 
R&D is typically conducted by large multinational enterprises that operate subsidiaries in 
each others’ home markets. Strategic interaction between R&D decisions have received 
substantial attention in the theoretical studies in industrial organization that have emphasized 
the role of inter-firm R&D spillovers (e.g. Petit and Sanna-Randaccio, 2000; Cassiman et al., 
2002). A limited number of the theoretical papers have also examined strategic effects in 
foreign investment or foreign R&D location decisions (e.g. Belderbos at al., 2004; Siotis, 
1999, Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2001). However, to date no empirical evidence has been provided 
for consequences of strategic interactions in international R&D location decisions.   
This paper addresses this gap in current knowledge, by developing and empirically 
testing a model of foreign R&D investments that takes into account strategic interaction in 
R&D location decisions by multinational firms in the context of R&D spillovers and foreign 
technology sourcing strategies. We expand and adapt a two-country two-firm model of 
strategic R&D location decisions developed in Belderbos et al. (2004). Two multinational 
firms operating subsidiaries in each others’ home markets decided on the share of R&D to be 
conducted in the foreign subsidiary. They take into account the potential outgoing R&D 
spillovers to the rival firm, and foreign technology sourcing opportunities from the foreign   3
rival and the general knowledge pool available in the host country. Knowledge sourcing 
requires an absorptive capacity which is only present in case of localized R&D. The optimal 
share of R&D performed abroad by a multinational firm depends on the efficiency of intra-
firm international technology transfer, the degree of local inter-firm R&D spillovers, and the 
intensity of product market competition. The model distinguishes between technology leading 
firms and technology laggards and finds that the impact of these factors differs markedly 
between the two types of firms. We find support for most of the predictions of the model in an 
empirical analysis of patents based on innovations in foreign countries by 131 leading 
European manufacturing firms in 22 ISIC industries in 1996-1997. For technology leaders, 
the share of patents originating in other EU countries responds positively to host country 
product market competition and is strongly increasing in the level of intellectual property 
rights protection. Foreign R&D by technology laggards is discouraged by host country 
competition but increases with the efficiency of (reverse) technology transfer. Foreign R&D 
of both leaders and laggards increases with the size of the local knowledge pool and the size 
of production operations in the host country. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model 
of strategic R&D location and derives the main predictions from this model. Section 3 
describes the data set, variable construction and empirical model. Section 4 presents empirical 
results and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. A model of Strategic Interactions in R&D Location Decisions 
 
Previous theoretical models focusing on foreign R&D decisions by multinational firms 
have mainly taken the perspective of a single multinational firm, treating domestic and 
foreign rival firms as a competitive fringe and thus ignoring strategic interaction among 
competing MNEs (Norback, 2001; Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers, 2002). Other 
contributions have been more concerned with the effect of country-specific stocks of 
knowledge on R&D decentralization (Franck and Owen, 2003), the geography of R&D within 
a single country in the presence of R&D spillovers (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 1999), location 
incentives of different types of R&D (Cadot and Desruelle, 1998) or with strategic FDI rather 
than strategic R&D (Siotis, 1999, Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2001). Belderbos et al. (2004)   4
specifically focuses on strategic interactions in R&D decisions between multinational firms 
based in different home countries.  
In this paper we expand and adapt the two-country two-firm model of strategic R&D 
location decisions developed in Belderbos et al. (2004). Two multinational firms operating 
subsidiaries in each others’ home markets decided on the share of R&D to be conducted in the 
foreign subsidiary. They take into account the potential outgoing R&D spillovers to the rival 
firm, and foreign technology sourcing opportunities from the foreign rival and the general 
knowledge pool available in the host country. Knowledge sourcing requires an absorptive 
capacity which is only present in case of localized R&D. In what follows, we describe the 





There are two multinational firms that decide on the optimal allocation of their R&D budget 
i X ,  () 2 , 1 = i  between home and host country operations. The allocation of R&D determines 
the effective knowledge base available at headquarters and in the foreign subsidiary. These 
effective knowledge bases in turn have a positive impact on profits. Denoting  i λ  as the share 
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Profits of firm i are the sum of profits of the parent firm at home (p) and profits of the 
foreign subsidiary (s) minus the cost of dispersing R&D and transferring R&D resources 
abroad. We assume that this cost function is concave in the share of R&D located abroad and 
the level of R&D expenditures, to capture the effect of scale and scope advantages of 
centralized R&D operations. The parameter δ  measures the size of the cost disadvantage of 
dispersed R&D operations.  
Profits of the subsidiary and parent operations are an increasing function of the 
knowledge bases available (K) in these locations, by reducing costs and/or enhancing 
demand. On the other hand, the rival firm’s knowledge base reduces the relative cost or the 
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The impact of the knowledge stocks on profits are captured by the parameter b, which can 
reflect the size of the market as well the technological opportunities in the industry. For 
simplicity, we assume this parameter to be equal across firms and markets. Parameter µ 
measures the impact of rival firm’s knowledge base on firm profits, and is a measure of the 
intensity of product market competition. We make the conventional assumption that the 
marginal impact of rival’s knowledge bases on profits is smaller than the marginal impact of 
the own knowledge base  ) 1 0 ( < <µ .  
 
 
Effective Knowledge Bases 
 
Before we can analyze the firm’s optimal localization decisions, we need to 
characterize the composition of firms’ effective knowledge bases, both at the parent and at the 
subsidiary level. With respect to own R&D resources, we allow the firms to differ in the size 
of their total own R&D resources.  Firm 1 is assumed to possess larger R&D resources and, 
therefore, characterized as the ‘technology leader’, while firm 2 is the ‘technology laggard’, 
i.e.:  2 1 X X > .  The relative technology lead of the leader, denoted by the parameter s, 





s=  (with  1 0 < < s ).  The higher is s, the 
smaller is the technology gap between the leader and the laggard. 
Firms can transfer knowledge internally from parent to subsidiary and vice versa.   
These internal knowledge transfers cross national boundaries; hence they are international in 
scope.  They are also imperfect, not only because of the costs associated with transferring 
knowledge internationally within the firm, but also because of the need to adapt the 
transferred know-how to local conditions. For analytical convenience, we assume symmetry 
between the two firms in terms of internal transfer efficiency, which is indicated by the 
parameter  β  ( 1 0 < < β ), representing the share of knowledge that ‘survives’ if transferred 
intra-firm across countries.   6
Inter-firm knowledge spillovers between the two firms are geographically bounded 
and are assumed to occur only between headquarters and subsidiaries located in the same 
country. This is in line with the agglomeration literature, which suggests that inter-firm, 
external knowledge dissemination requires geographic proximity, (e.g. Gersbach & 
Schmutzler, 1999). Spillovers are bi-directional: a firm benefits from incoming spillovers if it 
co-locates R&D, but this will also increase outgoing spillovers to the rival firm. Parameter α  
represents the share of knowledge that spills over inter-firm with  1 0 < <α .  
General knowledge spillovers are spillovers originating from non-rival firms’ local 
R&D activities and R&D conducted at public institutions.  They are treated as localized and 
benefiting from them requires an R&D presence in the country. We allow for differences in 
the size of the general knowledge pool available in the two countries, with  1 2 gG G =  (with  g  
an index of the relative technology advantage of country 2). Inter-firm and general knowledge 
spillovers require, and are enhanced by, the absorptive capacity of the firm in the country as 
represented by the firm’s own local R&D resources. 
  Given the above assumptions, the effective knowledge base at the parent and 
subsidiary are given by:  
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The effective knowledge base of the parent at headquarters consists of three parts. The first 
term represents the internal R&D allocated to the parent. The second term is the internal 
knowledge flowing back from the subsidiary of firm i to the parent (intra-firm spillover): it is 
the combination of the internal knowledge transfer efficiency parameter β  and the potential 
knowledge base to transfer, with the latter consisting of the subsidiary’s own R&D and 
incoming external spillovers in the foreign country (the benefits to the parent from foreign 
knowledge sourcing).  The third term represents incoming external (or inter-firm) knowledge 
spillovers in the home country of firm i, which originate from the R&D resources that rival 
firm j has located abroad to its subsidiary. In addition, the parent firm sources knowledge 
from the locally available general knowledge stock. The main assumptions concerning the 
different knowledge flows are illustrated in Figure 1. The knowledge base of the subsidiary in 
the host country has a similar structure.   7
 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
 
Optimal R&D Allocation 
 
The R&D localization ratio ( i λ ) will affect the effective knowledge base of both the 
parent and the subsidiary through all three components.   It will influence not only the R&D 
resources available at each plant, but also the internal knowledge transfers and, through the 
absorptive-capacity effect, also the incoming external spillovers. Using equations (1)-(3.2), 
we solve for the optimal share of R&D allocated to the subsidiary of firm 1 and firm 2. The 
first-order conditions yield the following best response functions
1: 
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   The reaction functions are downward sloping and R&D localization of firms i and j 
are strategic substitutes. This reflects the agglomeration enhancing impact of inter-firm 
knowledge spillovers: firm i can increase the impact of R&D resources on its knowledge 
bases by responding to an increase in foreign R&D by rival firm j (in the home country of 
firm i) with increased concentration of R&D resources in its home country. Increasing R&D 
at home enhances the firm’s absorptive capacity and allows it to benefit more from the 
expanded sourcing opportunities due to the rival’s increase in local R&D. From 4.1 
Solving for the optimal λ gives the following expressions for firm 1, the technology 
leader and for firm 2, the technology laggard:
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1 The existence and stability conditions are provided in the appendix.   8
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From (5.1) and (5.2) we can derive a number of predictions concerning the impact of 
the key parameters of the model: the intensity of spilloversα , the efficiency of international 
technology transferβ , and the intensity of product market competitionµ , and the relative size 
of the local pool of knowledge g. The expressions for these derivations are relegated to the 
appendix.  
Analytical results for the intensity of spillovers α  suggest that given a relatively 
strong technology leadership position of the leading firm ( 2 , 1 = < i s s i
α ), the leader will 
decrease the share of R&D located abroad in a response to greater R&D spillovers, while the 
laggard increases the share of foreign R&D: This result reflects the leader’s interest to reduce 
potential knowledge dissipation and, on the other hand, the laggard’s stronger knowledge 
sourcing motivation. 
 
Proposition 1: Under strong technological leadership, the technology leader responds to 
greater inter-firm R&D spillovers by reducing the share of foreign R&D, while the 
technologically lagging firm increases it. 
 
The impact of the efficiency of international technology transfer intra-firm also differs for 
leaders and laggards. Given a relatively strong technology lead (
β
i s s < ) , the leader decreases 
the share of R&D abroad in response to an increased transfer efficiency while the laggard 
again increases foreign R&D. Increased efficiency strengthens the incentive of the leader to 
centralize R&D at home and reduce decentralization costs, while its subsidiary relies on 
knowledge transferred from the home laboratory. Foreign R&D allows the laggard to benefit 
from more reverse transfer of foreign sourced knowledge, an effect which is more important 
for the laggard than for the leader 
   9
Proposition 2: Under strong technological leadership, the technology leader responds to 
greater efficiency of international knowledge transfer by reducing the share of foreign R&D, 
while the technologically lagging firm increases it. 
 
The intensity of product market competition µ  has an opposite effect from the impact of intra 
firm knowledge transfer efficiency and R&D spillovers. Under relatively strong technology 
leadership (
µ
i s s <  with 
α µ
i i s s = .), the leader increases the share of R&D abroad while the 
laggard reduces it. Increased product market competition makes the leader more aggressive in 
the rival’s home market and leads to a larger incentive for R&D decentralization to capture a 
larger share of profits in the foreign market, which is possible because of the weakness of the 
local rival in its home market.  This effect is stronger than the detrimental impact of increased 
outgoing external spillovers in the foreign market with stronger product market competition. 
For the laggard, increased product market competition leads to a response to defend its home 
market position by keeping more R&D resources at home. 
 
Proposition 3: Under strong technological leadership, the technology leader responds to 
greater product market competition by increasing the share of foreign R&D, while the 
technologically lagging firm reduces it. 
 
An asymmetry in the optimal R&D allocation between technology leaders and laggards is not 
observed if it concerns the impact of the relative size of the general knowledge pool. Both 
firms increase foreign R&D if the size of the relative general knowledge pool abroad 
increases.  
 
Proposition 4: Both technology leaders and technology laggards increase the share of R&D 




3. Data and Empirical Methods 
 
In the empirical analysis we aim to find evidence for the proposition of the model of 
strategic R&D location. We use data on domestic and foreign innovation activities of 131   10
European firms that are leading in European manufacturing industries. The dataset combines 
information on their patenting activities and location of innovative activities that resulted in 
those patents, and their production activities in 15 EU countries and 22 (2-digit ISIC) 
manufacturing industries in 1996-1997. The firms are in the top-5 of EU manufacturing in at 
least one industry.
2 Patent data are patent applications with the European Patent Office in the 
years 1996-1997. The patent applications are assigned to a country on the basis of the address 
of the inventor listed in the patent information. Patents are assigned to ISIC industries based 
on the MERIT patent to industry concordance, adapted to third revision ISIC classifications. 
This concordance attaches to each international patent classification code (IPC, describing the 
technological domain of the patent) a probability that it is originating in a specific ISIC 
industry, based on the industries of applicant firms. 
The leading EU firms applied for 14298 patents in these years, of which 2666 were 
based on R&D activities outside the home country. Table 2 shows the matrix of the location 
of R&D activities leading to patent applications. It is shown that Germany is an important 
host country for non-German EU firms’ R&D activities. Germany is also a major home 
country of multinational firms active in foreign R&D in other EU countries. France is also a 
major location of other EU firms’ R&D operations, followed by the UK and Belgium. 
 
Insert Table 1. 
 
The dependent variable in the empirical model follows the definition in the strategic 
R&D location model. It is the ratio of R&D activities (as derived from patent application) in 
EU country j, to total R&D activities in home country i and host country j, while we 
differentiate per industry k. This foreign R&D ratio is defined as 
j h pat pat pat ihk ijk ijk ijk ≠ + = ), /( λ . For each leading firm we observe this ratio of foreign to 
domestic R&D for each (potential) EU host country as long as the firm has patenting output in 
the particular industry. In total, this gave us 972 observations host country patents of the EU 
firms in the dataset.  
We distinguish between leaders and laggards based on the number of patent 
applications in the industry by the EU firms. The technology leader in the European industry 
                                                 
2 The data on production locations of EU firms are taken from Van Pelt et al. (2001). In addition to the EU firms, 
28 non-EU firms are identified among Europe’s largest manufacturers. These firms are excluded from the 
empirical analysis as they do not have a ‘home country’ within the EU. Patents and production of these firms are 
taken into account when calculating leadership and concentration measures.   11
is defined as the firm with the largest number of EU patents applications that are classified 
within that industry. The technology advantage of the leader is the size of the technology gap 
between leader and the laggards and defined as the ratio of the laggards’ patents in industry k 





ijk ik pat pat lead / . The variable lead takes the value one for EU leaders. 
  The first independent variable is the intensity of R&D spillovers (proposition 1). 
These external spillovers are determined by technology specific factors (such as the 
complexity of know-how affecting the degree of appropriation, and the effectiveness of the 
legal appropriation regime for specific technologies) and by country specific factors (the 
strength of IPR protection). We focus here on the country specific variation, by taking as a 
proxy for the R&D spillovers and appropriability conditions, the strength of a country’s patent 
protection. The index of intellectual property rights is due to Ginarte and Park (1997) and 
measures the strength of patents laws and enforcement. We include the variable  hj IPR , the 
ratio of the  index of IPR protection in host country j over the IPR protection index in firm’s i 
home country. Countries with better IPR protection should see more R&D allocation by the 
leader but not by the laggard.
3 
Proposition 2 calls for the inclusion of a proxy for the efficiency of international 
(bilateral) technology transfer by multinational firms. An increase in the intra-firm knowledge 
transfer reflects more efficient transfer of knowledge within the firm, e.g. because of better 
knowledge management practices or information and communication technologies. It also 
reflects a reduction in differences in markets between the two countries, reducing the need to 
adapt knowledge transferred across countries, and the fact that coordination costs reduce with 
geographic distance. Hence as proxy for this transfer efficiency measure we can take a 
measure of ‘closeness’ of product markets in the two countries for the industry related to the 
intensity of export and import flows in the industry between the countries. We use the 
indicator of intra-industry trade: transfer efficiency  ( ) j h od od M X jk hk hjk hjk ≠ + + = ), Pr /(Pr , where 
hjk X  represents the exports in industry k from country j (the host country) to country h (the 
home country of firm i),  hjk M  are the imports in industry k of country j from country h, and 
Prod represent the value of production in the industry in the two countries (data are taken 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, the model in section 2 and proposition 1 do not differentiate between spillovers (IPR 
protection) in the home and host countries. Further analysis (Belderbos et al. 2004) shows that the results can be 
extended to the relative intensity of R&D spillovers in the host country. The same reasoning applies to the 
implementation of proposition 3 as the relative concentration ratio.    12
from the OECD STAN database). Higher values for this measure indicate greater similarities 
between markets and easier use of foreign technologies. Proposition 2 predicts a negative 
impact on foreign R&D for leaders and a positive impact for laggards. 
Proposition 3 suggests the use of an indicator of product market competition. We use a 
measure of production concentration in the home and host country to measure this impact. 
Herfindahl is the ratio of the host country Herfindahl index of concentration relative to the 











2 /  with  ijk m  the production share of firm 
i in country j and industry k,  ihk m  the production share of firm i in its home country h and 
industry k, and n being the number of EU and non-EU leading firms producing in country j 
and industry k. Proposition 3 suggests a negative impact of Herfindahl on the foreign R&D 
ratio for leaders but a positive impact for laggards. 
Proposition 4 suggests a positive impact on foreign R&D of the size of the general 
knowledge pool in a host country relative to the home country. As proxy for the relative size 
of the knowledge base we take the number of patents granted in 1996-1997 to residents in the 
countries and classified in the industry: Knowledge Pool =  j h Patents Patents hk jk ≠ , / . 
Proposition 4 suggests a positive impact on the share of host country R&D for both leaders 
and laggards.  
  The theoretical model did not take into account differences in the size of firms’ 
operations in the home and host country (i.e. differences in the parameter b). The scale of 
production is expected to have an important impact on R&D expenditures, as larger 
operations increase the return on in particular R&D to adapt products and processes to local 
market circumstances (e.g. Belderbos, 2003). Hence we include firm size as a control 
variable. Firm size is defined as the share of production of firm i in a foreign country j in 
industry k over the sum of production of firm i in its home country (h) in industry k and its 
production at country j in industry k  =  j h prod prod prod ihk ijk ijk ≠ + ), /( . 
The dependent variable, the ratio of host country R&D relative to R&D in the home 
and host countries combined is restricted in the interval [0,1], we use employ a two-limit 
Tobit model to related the dependent variable to the explanatory variables. Statistics on the 
dependent and explanatory variables are provided in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
The results of the Tobit model are presented in Table 3. The model is highly 
significant and generally performs well with a pseudo R
2 of 37,5. Proposition 1 is only 
partially supported by the empirical results. Indeed, technology leaders are highly sensitive to 
the level of IPR protection (reducing outgoing R&D spillovers) abroad, as the interaction 
between the IPR ratio and the leadership ratio (lead) is positive and significant. Laggards, 
however, are also increasing the ratio of foreign R&D in response to better IPR protection, 
though the magnitude of this effect is significantly smaller than the effect for leaders. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
The estimated coefficients for transfer efficiency provide qualified support for 
proposition 2. The main coefficient of this variable is positive, indicating that multinational 
firms generally located more R&D in a host country industry if it is relatively effective and 
less costly to transfer and use foreign technologies. In contrast, the interaction effect with lead 
is negative and significant, confirming that technology leaders are significantly less likely to 
increase foreign R&D in response to greater transfer efficiency. The coefficient of the 
interaction effect, however, is not greater than the coefficient of the main effect, which 
implies that transfer efficiency does not impact foreign R&D negatively. The empirical results 
provide full support for proposition 3. The ratio of host to home country concentration 
(herfindahl) indices has a positive and significant general impact of foreign R&D, while the 
interaction effect with the leadership ratio is negative and significant. The magnitudes of these 
effects are such that relative concentration has a negative impact for technology leaders. 
Hence, while technology laggards reduce foreign R&D in response to greater product market 
competition there, technology leaders increase the foreign R&D ratio to make use of their 
technology advantage and capture a larger share of the local market. Laggards in contrast, 
concentrate R&D at home to defend their home market position. 
The empirical results also support proposition 4 in full. The relative size of the general 
knowledge pool in the host country has a positive and significant impact on the foreign R&D 
ratio. This is not different for leaders, as the interaction effect with the leadership ratio is 
insignificant. Hence the relative strength of a country’s technology and knowledge base in an 
industry attracts R&D by both leaders and lagging firms, as predicted. Finally, the size of the   14
firm’s host country production relative to home market operations in the industry has the 





In this paper we develop and empirically test a model of foreign R&D investments that 
takes into account strategic interaction in R&D location decisions by multinational firms in 
the context of R&D spillovers and foreign technology sourcing strategies. When deciding on 
R&D internationalization, firms take into account the benefits in terms of incoming R&D 
spillovers in the local market from the rival firm and better access to the general knowledge 
pool in the host country (technology sourcing). On the other hand, firms also face greater risk 
of dissipation of know-how from their own R&D abroad to their rivals, which would favor 
reliance on international intra-firm technology transfer from headquarters to the host country. 
The model takes into account the ‘two faces’ of R&D: the positive impact on absorptive 
capacity which increases the benefits of incoming spillovers, as well as the direct positive 
effect on the firm’s knowledge base. Absorptive capacity (local R&D) is a prerequisite for 
local technology sourcing. In a two-country, two-firm model with international cross 
investments, the optimal share of R&D performed abroad depends on the efficiency of intra-
firm international technology transfer, the degree of inter-firm R&D spillovers, the intensity 
of product market competition, and the importance of the general knowledge pools. The 
impact of these factors on the optimal share of foreign R&D differs markedly between the 
technologically leading firm (the firm with the highest R&D expenditures) and the 
technologically lagging firm if the gap between the two firms is important.  
We find partial support for the predictions of the model in an empirical analysis of 
foreign R&D (as reflected in patent applications) in EU countries by 131 leading European 
manufacturing firms in 22 ISIC industries in 1996-1997. Greater efficiency of intra-firm 
technology transfer abroad leads to increased R&D abroad by technology laggards, because 
their home market operations can benefit from more effective foreign technology sourcing. 
Technology leaders are much less responsive to this transfer efficiency, as their host market 
operations can rely more effectively on technology developed at home and transferred abroad. 
Weaker R&D spillovers due to a greater effectiveness of intellectual property rights 
protection in the host country relative to the home country increases R&D by both leaders and 
laggards, but technology leaders are significantly more responsive to this factor. Technology   15
leaders face greater appropriability concerns, but for technology laggards such concerns are 
mitigated by technology sourcing motives in the host country. The results imply that there is a 
tendency of R&D to agglomerate in the country with the stronger IPR protection (c.f. 
Branstetter et al., 2003). Weaker product market competition (higher concentration) in the 
host country relative to the home country encourages foreign R&D by the lagging firms, but 
has a negative impact on foreign R&D by technology leaders. More intense product market 
competition encourages leading firms to engage in offensive foreign R&D in order to make 
use of their technology advantage and to capture a larger share of the local market. Laggards 
in contrast, are more likely to concentrate R&D at home to defend their home market 
position. Finally, both leaders and laggards are attracted to countries with relatively larger 
general knowledge pools relevant to the industry.  
  The findings demonstrate that predictions from a model of strategic R&D location 
decisions by multinational firms are relevant in the empirical setting of EU firms’ foreign 
R&D activities. At the same time, the results indicate potentially fruitful avenues for further 
research and improvement. Theoretical modeling should further focus on the impact of 
asymmetries between host and home countries on R&D location decisions. Empirical tests 
could improve the empirical proxies for in particular technology transfer efficiency and IPR 
(spillovers). Measures of intra-firm technology transfer efficiency could be derived from 
industry- and country-specific measures of patent citations between home and host countries. 
Since appropriability conditions and spillovers differ among industries, industry level data on 
IPR would bring out more detailed effects of host and home country conditions. Data from the 
Community Innovation Surveys may be an interesting source of information on industry- and 
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Table 1: Patents Based on Foreign R&D Activities by the Larges EU Manufacturing Firms, 1996-1997  
Host Country 
Home Country  AT BE DE DK SP  FI FR GB GR IE  IT NL PO SE  Total 
AT    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
BE  0   30  0 0 0 8 4 0 0 1 1 0 0  44 
DE  126  197   17  46 0  120  107  1  2 44  51 0 46  756 
DK  0 0 0    1 5 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0  9 
SP  0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
FI  0 0  30  12  0    2  53  0 0 0 1 0 3  100 
FR  2 66  425  1 13 1    38 0  0 22 6  0  1  575 
GB  0  23  93  0 1 0  88   0 0  26  10  0 3  244 
GR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0  0 
IE  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0  0 
IT  0  31  18  1 7 0  35  11  0 0    2 0 0  104 
NL  14  17  196  0 1 0  136  67  0 0 8    0  18  458 
PO  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0  0 
SE  8  4  161  13 1 28  18  25 0  0 68  50 0    375 
Total  151  337  953  44 69 34  407  307 1  2 169  122 0  70  2666 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Lambda  IPR  Transfer 
Efficiency 
Herfindahl Knowledge Pool Firm size 
 Mean  0.093004   0.988099   0.019355   6.421857   1.297751   0.145980 
 Median  0.001291   1.000000   0.011294   0.700208   0.279103   0.066902 
 Maximum  1.000000   1.315108   0.484728   600.2644   38.00000   1.000000 
 Minimum  0.000000   0.605023   2.82E-06   2.59E-06   0.000000   0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.222236   0.128464   0.034699   32.70081   3.080382   0.215557 
Observations  972  972  972 972  972 972   20
Table 3: Tobit estimates for lambda 
 
Notes: Estimated with two-limit (0,1) Tobit;*, **, indicate significance  







Transfer Efficiency  1.8543***
(0.5064)




Herfindahl* Lead  -0.0046**
(0.0018)
Knowledge Pool  0.0126***
(0.0042)
Knowledge Pool*Lead  -0.0084
(0.0230)





Log Likelihood  -344.28964
LR chi2  413.48
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2  0.3752  21
Appendix A. Existence of Equilibrium and Stability Conditions 
 
Using the reaction functions: 
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Existence and stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium require that:  
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Proposition 3:  
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Appendix C: ISIC Industries 
 ISICNO 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco  1 
Textiles, Clothing, Leather and Footwear  2 
Wood & Furniture  3 
Paper, Printing and Publishing  4 
Chemicals 5 
Drugs & Medicines  6 
Petroleum and Coal Products and Refinery  7 
Rubber and Plastic  8 
Non Metallic Mineral Products  9 
Iron & Steel  10 
Non-Ferrous Metals  11 
Metal Products  12 
Non-Electrical Machinery  13 
Office, Computing and Accounting Machinery  14 
Electrical Machinery  15 
Radio, TV and Communication Equipment  16 
Shipbuilding and Repairing  17 
Motor Vehicles  18 
Aerospace & Aircraft  19 
Other Transport Equipment  20 
Professional Goods/Medical & optical & precision equipment  21 
Other Manufacturing  22 
 